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Abstract
We follow 3,512 (of 1.4 million) applicants to a government lottery that randomly al-
located visas to Bangladeshis for low-skilled, temporary labor contracts in Malaysia.
Most lottery winners migrate, and their remittance substantially raises their family’s
standard of living in Bangladesh. The migrant’s absence pauses demographic changes
(marriage, childbirth, household formation), and shifts decision-making power towards
females. Migration removes enterprising individuals, lowering household entrepreneur-
ship, but does not crowd out other family members’ labor supply. One group of ap-
plicants were offered deferred migration that never materialized. Improved migration
prospects induce pre-migration investments in skills that generate no returns in the
domestic market.
Keywords: government-intermediated international migration
JEL Codes: F22, O12, O15
∗We thank Bangladesh Bureau of Manpower, Employment, and Training (BMET) for providing the ad-
ministrative lottery applicant data to make this study possible, Innovations for Poverty Action - Bangladesh
for fieldwork, the World Bank Rapid Social Response Multi-Donor Trust Fund and the DEC Research Sup-
port Budget for financial support, Sam Bazzi, Rob Jensen, Manjula Luthria, David McKenzie, Ganesh Seshan
and Steven Stillman, and participants at the Migration and Development conference for helpful discussions
and feedback. Robert Remuszka and Corey Vernot provided excellent research assistance.
†Yale University, Deakin University, NBER and CEPR. Contact: ahmed.mobarak@yale.edu
‡World Bank
§World Bank. Contact: mshrestha1@worldbank.org
1 Introduction
3.5 percent of the world’s population, currently live outside their country of birth (UNDESA,
2019). This reflects a 50% increase in the number of international migrants since 2000. They
remitted $689 billion back to their home countries in 2018 (World Bank, 2019). That makes
remittance the most important international financial flow into developing countries, triple
the size of Official Development Assistance, and easily surpassing any reasonable estimate of
the gains to removing all trade barriers. Migration contributed an estimated 9.4% of global
GDP in 2015 (McKinsey, 2016). Remittances accounted for 29% of GDP in Kyrgyz Republic
and Tajikistan, 27% in Nepal, and 6% in Bangladesh in 2019 (World Bank, 2021).
We report on an experiment in which the Government of Bangladesh allocated work visas
in Malaysia via lottery. Migration is a popular livelihood strategy in South Asia, and 10% of
the Bangladeshi male labor force works abroad (Das et al., 2018). 1.43 million Bangladeshis
applied when Malaysia offered 30,000 work visas through an agreement with the Bangladesh
government, which necessitated the lottery. The typical job contract was for semi-skilled
work at palm oil plantations. Male migrants traveled alone on temporary contracts. We
tracked down the families of a random sample of 3,512 lottery winners and losers from
across Bangladesh five years after the lottery. Our sampling frame comprised three largest
(of the eight) divisions of Bangladesh, which houses 57% of the country’s population.
We estimate the returns to migration in an especially consequential context. South Asians
moving temporarily to richer nations in Asia is one of the most popular global migration
corridors. Of the 270 million migrants in the world, over 31 million are South Asians living in
Asia (UNDESA, 2019). Bangladesh alone supplies almost 7 million migrants to other Asian
countries. Malaysia was the fourth largest source of remittances flowing into Bangladesh
during 2014-2019 (Bangladesh Bank, 2019). Our results are therefore representative of an
important migration corridor. If we are to make confident inferences about the global eco-
nomic effects of migration, we must investigate how South Asians fare when a family member
travels to richer Asian nations.
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International migration takes many forms around the world - some migrate permanently
to high-income nations on the strength of their skills or employer sponsorship, others cross
borders illegally with the intention to stay temporarily. Sponsored migration offers paths to
residency in some countries, and in such cases workers often travel with spouse and children,
expecting to stay at the destination long-term. In most countries, temporary work permits
do not offer any legal path to citizenship, and workers often travel alone for a pre-specified
contract period. Migrants will obviously share and remit differently if their nuclear family is
left behind, and if they expect to return (Ashraf et al. 2014). There is therefore no one single
estimate of returns to migration that would apply globally, and rigorous studies (e.g. Clemens
and Tiongson, 2017; Gibson et al., 2010) have produced vastly different estimates. Even
within temporary labor contracts, how the connection between employees and employers
are mediated matter. Unscrupulous middlemen tempt desperate migrants with fraudulent
opportunities and many migrants suffer large losses (Das et al., 2018).
The Bangladesh-Malaysia program we study is representative of the most common form
of global migration: temporary work visas where unskilled and semi-skilled workers travel
alone. Such contracts account for the lion’s share of cross-border movements around the
world. Over 25 million South Asian migrants work under such conditions in richer Asian
nations. 45% of all Singapore residents and 88% of UAE residents at any given moment are
foreign-born. The sheer volume of migration opportunities these countries provide contribute
more to South Asian development than OECD economies do. However, these migrants have
limited rights, working under arrangements that often puts them in precarious positions.
Against that backdrop, we study an innovative Government-to-Government (G2G) mi-
gration facilitation program with the potential to address several market failures present in
private sector intermediation that create such vulnerabilities. First, migration is a complex
undertaking (requires procuring a lot of hard-to-obtain paperwork, passports, visas, medical
checks), and low-skilled, semi-literate workers are dependent on expensive intermediation
services (ILO 2015). Credit constrained workers are forced to enter complex arrangements
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with middlemen and employers, in which wages are withheld to pay back fees. Given the
asymmetric power dynamic, low-skilled migrants are exploited by unscrupulous agencies
(UNODC 2015). Second, visas are often tied to a specific employer, transitions are not
allowed, and the workers’ passports are confiscated by employers as security. This gives
employers monopsony power over migrant workers (Naidu et al. 2016). Female migrants
working inside the homes of private employers are especially vulnerable (Beaubien 2019).
Third, migration is risky. 34% of aspiring Bangladeshi migrants fail to find work abroad,
and over half of these are due to fraudulent middlemen (Das et al. 2018). The loss associated
with failure - US$ 818 on average - is especially difficult for low-skilled workers to bear, and
insurance of a government-mediated connection may be useful. Fourth, there are over 900
recruitment agencies in the market of highly variable quality. Some falsify documents, don’t
provide legally mandated training and support abroad, and low-skilled migrants are not well
informed about the quality of specific agencies. Beyond the risks of fraud, exploitation, and
migration failure, there is also no guarantee that migrants would (be able to) save and remit
enough to contribute to poverty reduction back home, or make their families better off on
net, given the loans they have to incur to pay for high transport costs and intermediation
fees, as well as any adverse social effects stemming from extended family separation and
potential absence of a parent. Conducting rigorous evaluation of the full range of effects of
(this very common form of) international migration is therefore critical.
In fact, Malaysia instituted a ban on migration from Bangladesh in 2009 citing recruit-
ment malpractices in both countries, and the G2G mechanism we are studying was initiated
to resume that migration flow. The program lowered intermediation fees to US$400 per
migrant from the $3000-$4000 that were being charged by private recruiters prior to the
ban (Wickramasekara 2016). Given the potential for G2G mechanisms to improve migration
flows in a world where the inefficient spatial distribution of labor imposes trillion dollar costs
on the global economy (Clemens 2011), this experimental evaluation of a G2G program has
important implications for future policy design in many countries. Many countries, including
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Australia, New Zealand, large hosts of migrants in the Gulf, have moved towards institu-
tionalizing bilateral labor agreements where governments participate more intensively in the
recruitment of workers. G2G arrangements regulate migration into South Korea from over
16 countries (Cho et al., 2018). A prominent early example of a G2G agreement is the 1961
‘guest worker’ program negotiated between the West German and Turkish governments that
brought over 650,000 Turkish workers to Germany over the next 15 years. The program was
replicated by other western European nations, which led to another 135,000 Turks emigrating
to France, Austria, Netherlands and Belgium over that same period (Palut, 2020).
76% of the Malaysian visa lottery winners in our sample had migrated internationally by
the time of our survey, compared to 19% of the lottery losers who form our control group.
Quite unlike the New Zealand visa lottery studied by Gibson et al. (2010), our estimates
show that winning the Malaysian lottery doubled household income in Bangladesh, and
this is driven entirely by a large increase in the migrant’s earnings in Malaysia and the
remittance he sends back. This increases per-capita consumption and land and housing
investments back home, and lowers poverty and indebtedness. Our estimates provide a well-
identified, micro-data based foundation to the results found from analysis of macroeconomic
data (e.g. Clemens 2011, Ashenfelter 2012, Benhabib and Jovanovic 2012), which report
potential income gains that are several multiples of home income.
Beyond the direct economic impact, winning the visa lottery also produces important
demographic changes. The migrant’s absence delays his marriage, childbirth, and pauses
new family formation. Among married migrants, there are drastic improvements in the
participation of women on various aspects of household decision-making (similar to Clemens
and Tiongson 2017), especially when the migrant’s father is not living in that household.
Some other economic changes are a little surprising. Despite the sharp rise in household
income, the other non-migrant members of the family do not change their labor supply.1
1The literature finds mixed evidence on such spillovers (see Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006; Binzel
and Assaad, 2011; Grigorian and Melkonyan, 2011; Kim, 2007; Mendola and Carletto, 2009; Mu and Van de
Walle, 2011; Shrestha, 2017a).
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Winning the visa lottery keeps household economic activities unchanged in most dimensions,
except that it lowers the family’s participation in non-farm entrepreneurial activities in
Bangladesh. The migrant’s departure removes the most enterprising member of the family
who would have been that entrepreneur had he stayed home.
A program implementation quirk also allows us to estimate the effects of improved mi-
gration prospects on pre-departure investments in formal skills and language skills, as well
as the returns to that investment in either the Malaysian or the domestic labor market. A
(random) group of lottery winners were promised deferred intermediation, but many of them
were ultimately not given visas due to administrative constraints. Like other winners, this
group invests in the required vocational training, language training, and also in their own
physical fitness to prepare for the trip abroad. When those applicants got stuck at home,
these investments produced no returns in the domestic labor market.
2 Related Literature
Our research is related to the very large literature that estimates the returns to migration,
but has to grapple with difficult selection issues (Akee 2010, Grogger and Hanson 2011,
Gibson et al. 2013). Review papers by McKenzie and Yang (2010) and McKenzie (2012)
cite studies that exploit exogenous variation in immigration policies to study the effects of
international migration (such as Clemens 2010, Dinkelman and Mariotti 2016, Kusunose
and Rignall 2018). Others make use of a variety of other non-experimental methodologies,
including controls for observables, selection correction methods (Barham and Boucher 1998),
matching (McKenzie et al. 2010), instrumental variables (Brown and Leeves 2007, Mckenzie
and Rapoport 2007, Yang 2008, Macours and Vakis 2010), panel data techniques (Beegle
et al. 2011), and natural policy experiments (Clemens and Tiongson 2017).
The positive effects of the visa lottery that we document stand in sharp contrast to Gibson
et al. (2010)’s estimates of the adverse effects of winning a New Zealand migration lottery
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program on the family members of Tongan emigrants who remain behind. That study is the
closest to ours in terms of research design and rigor, but their setting is very different. That
program only takes 250 Tongans per year, which allows New Zealand to permit migrants
to travel with their spouse and children. Therefore any effects measured in Tonga are on
more distant household members, who naturally would not share in as much of the gains
from migration. In contrast, we study migration from a large country that supplies millions
of migrants, using a sampling frame that covers the majority of the 1.43 million program
applicants. The program we study typifies the most common form of labor migration in the
world: Male migrants travel alone on temporary contracts, and remit money back home to
their nuclear family. It is then not at all surprising that our effects look very different. The
positive effects we document are more reminiscent of the effects found for New Zealand’s
seasonal worker program on development in Tonga and Vanuatu, evaluated by Gibson and
McKenzie (2014) using a propensity score matched difference-in-differences method.
Clemens and Tiongson (2017) study a G2G program using a regression discontinuity (RD)
design around Filipino migrants’ performance on a Korean language test. They also find
that consumption increases with migration, but unlike us, do not observe household income
increases that can rationalize the large cross-country gap in wages observed in macroeconomic
data (Clemens et al. 2018). The difference may arise due to differences in the sample and
identifying variation. Applying to the Korean employment scheme required a high school
degree, work experience, and Korean language ability, and focuses on a set of applicants who
invested in learning Korean, but performed marginally on the language test. In contrast, the
Malaysia program had minimal requirements (only 2.5% of lottery winners were disqualified
through medical screening) and drew applicants from every district in Bangladesh. We
provide pure experimental estimates that apply to the entire distribution of applicants.
Beyond the big differences in sampling frames, our actual sample size is about 5-10 times
larger than all aforementioned evaluations, and this allows us to provide statistically precise,
robust estimates even after correcting standard errors for multiple hypothesis testing, or any
6
bias stemming from attrition or survey non-completion.
We report on demographic outcomes that connect to the literature on the broader socio-
demographic effects of migration on children, health and family (Alcaraz et al. 2012, Edwards
and Ureta 2003, Yang 2008, Giannelli and Mangiavacchi 2010), which is well summarized
by Antman (2013). Our results on skill acquisition prior to travel contributes to the debate
on brain-gain and brain-drain (Docquier et al., 2008; Beine et al., 2008; Batista et al., 2012;
Shrestha, 2017b; Abarcar et al., 2020; Chand and Clemens, 2019; Khanna and Morales,
2017). Our study adds to this literature in two ways: we find evidence of skills acquisition
even for low-skilled migration opportunities, and we document an investment response in
different dimensions of skill, including developing physical strength, and investing in health,
language, and vocational skills.
3 Context: Bangladesh-Malaysia G2G Program
The annual outflow of low-skilled temporary workers from Bangladesh has increased from
about 0.2 million workers in 2000 to well over 0.5 million in recent years (Figure 1). His-
torically, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, Malaysia, Qatar and Singapore have been the most
popular destinations.
Remittances sent by these workers have become an important source of national income.
Between 2000 and 2017, remittance inflows increased almost seven-fold. At its peak, between
2008 and 2012, remittances made up one-tenth of the national GDP. In 2015, Bangladesh
was the 10th largest remittance-receiving country globally. Remittances from workers abroad
have been one of the key drivers of poverty reduction, and they continue to be a large share
of household income for poorer households (Hill and Endara, 2016; World Bank, 2013, 2015).
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Figure 1: Migrant outflow for low-skilled work and remittance receipt
Source: BMET (2019) and World Development Indicators (2019).
Note: Figure shows annual outflows of low-skilled migrant workers from Bangladesh to the major destination
countries (left axis) and the annual remittances inflow as a share of GDP (right axis).
3.1 The G2G Program
Migration recruitment agencies in Bangladesh employ an extensive chain of middlemen
(dalals) to identify aspiring migrants, provide documentation services, and then place work-
ers in jobs abroad. This is a complex undertaking: a worker seeking to migrate must procure
a national identity certificate, their birth certificate, a passport, bank account, contract, visa,
a smart card containing identity documents, and a medical checkup; this list is not exhaus-
tive (ILO 2015). Lower skilled workers are more dependent on the services of middlemen
and end up paying a higher fraction of their expected income for these services (UNODC
2015). The cost of private intermediation in Bangladesh are estimated to exceed $4500,
which is over 3 times the GDP per-capita (World Bank, 2013; Farole et al., 2017). Most
migrants borrow, often at high interest rates, to finance the high costs of migration. High
indebtedness combined with fraudulent recruitment practices make migrants vulnerable to
long-term indebtedness and further exploitation.
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The government-to-government (G2G) recruitment system arose in response to con-
cerns about various forms of abuse associated with private intermediation services (Wickra-
masekara, 2016), which led to a ban on recruitment of Bangladeshi workers to Malaysia in
2009. The governments of Bangladesh and Malaysia signed a memorandum of understand-
ing in 2012 which lifted this ban, and introduced a new system in which labor recruitment
is handled directly by government agencies. Malaysia offered temporary visas of 2-3 year
duration for low-skilled manual work, where the migrants would travel alone without family.
The Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET) in Bangladesh advertised
the new migration opportunities in local newspapers, and started registering interested work-
ers in January 2013 through 4,529 rural Union Information and Service Centers (UISCs).
To be eligible, the applicant had to be male, aged between 18 and 45, at least 5 feet tall, at
least 50kg or more in weight, and able to lift a weight of 20kg or more.2 There was a small
fee of BDT 50-100 (USD 0.66-1.30) to register the application.
During the two-week registration process, BMET registered 1.43 million applicants from
all over rural Bangladesh. However, Malaysia had only offered a maximum of 30,000 visas.
To create a fair process, BMET implemented a randomized lottery in February 2013 through
a third-party - the Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology, and drew 36,038
winning names. The probability of selection was proportional to the size of the upazila
(subdistrict) population of the applicant.
A second lottery was conducted to split the 36,038 winners into three phases. First
phase winners would be recruited immediately. The second lottery resulted in 11,758 phase-
1 winners, 11,704 phase-2 winners and 12,576 phase-3 winners. All winners were notified
by SMS and phase-1 winners were required to undergo a medical screening plus a 10-day
training. In March 2013, BMET began sending information on potential workers to the
Malaysian government and by April 2013 had already sent information on 8,500 phase-1
2Other eligibility criteria included basic knowledge of Malaysian culture and social life, the ability to
communicate either in English or Malay, no prior criminal record, valid travel documents, and Malaysian
medical fitness requirements
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workers. Workers selected by the Malaysian government would then begin the migration
process. We provide more details about the process in Appendix A.
4 Data and empirical strategy
We conducted 3,512 in-depth household interviews with G2G applicants between August and
December of 2018, roughly five years after program inception. We refer to the Phase 1 lottery
winners who won the lottery to migrate and were put in the first phase of intermediation
as T1. We create a joint group of Phase 2 and Phase 3 winners, who won the lottery to
migrate but were put into a deferred phase of intermediation, and call them T2. Eventually,
this group only received partial (low rates of) intermediation. The lottery losers, referred to
as C, serve as the control group. The majority of our analysis will compare T1 to C. Figure
2 shows the various steps of the lottery program and the final study sample.
The survey included detailed modules on the migration, labor and earnings of all house-
hold members including the applicant and any other migrant members of the household.
Interviews were conducted with the applicants themselves if they were present, or with a
knowledgeable household member if the applicant was not present. The survey also had
modules on household consumption, enterprises, housing and assets, debt position, and fe-
male decision-making of the household in Bangladesh. We also collected data on applicant
and household characteristics that are unlikely to vary over time, as well as retrospective
data on some pre-lottery outcomes.
4.1 Data collection
Phase 1 winners (group T1) were thinly spread across Bangladesh. BMET limited the
number of Phase 1 winners in each village to at most one applicant. Unions, which typically
have about 6,000 households from a few villages, had an average of two Phase 1 winners.
To manage the geographic scope of data collection efforts within our budget, we limited
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Figure 2: Stages of lottery and study design
Note: The Figure shows the various stages of the lottery program and the study design.
the survey to Dhaka, Mymensingh, and Chittagong Divisions.3 These divisions housed 53
percent of Bangladesh’s population in 2011, including 48 percent of the rural population
(BBS, 2015). 38 percent of all lottery applicants and 50 percent of lottery winners come
from these divisions. They include the most densely populated and prosperous divisions of
Bangladesh. We randomly selected 49 of 223 upazilas from these divisions.4 The survey was
conducted in all 522 unions within the selected 49 upazilas.
Sampling strategy and field protocols
The relative scarcity of T1 households and the nature of available administrative data guided
our sampling and field protocols. We received administrative data from BMET in two
separate extracts. The first extract was for the lottery losers (group C) which included
information on the applicants’ names, their parents’ names, phone numbers, and the name
of the union they live in. The second extract was the published data on lottery winners
3The Mymensingh Division was formed in 2015, after the G2G lottery program, by splitting off the
northern districts of the Dhaka Division.
4The data extract we received from BMET had data from applicants in 223 of 258 upazilas. The
discrepancy could be a result of the lottery not collecting data from upazilas with very high urban penetration.
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(groups T1 and T2) which contained the same information, but did not include a phone
number for everyone. We were able to get matched phone numbers for groups T1 and T2
from BMET only for 76 percent of group T1 and 16 percent of group T2.
To deal with this asymmetry in information, we opted for a combination of phone and
field-based tracking of respondents. In each of the sampled unions, enumerators were in-
structed to find all the T1 individuals. Applicants in the T2 and control groups were ran-
domly ordered, and enumerators were instructed to follow that order in their search for
respondents. Enumerators would keep going down the randomized order until the number
of successful interviews in that group (T2 or control) matched the number of successful in-
terviews in the T1 group. This way, the final survey would have similar sample sizes across
treatment groups within each union.
To find the respondents in a sampled union, enumerators first tried calling the applicants
for whom we had phone numbers. Each applicant would be called up to five times over the
course of several days. If somebody picked up the phone, we also asked if they knew the
phone numbers of anyone else who won the lottery. We searched for lottery applicants not
reachable by phone through physical visits to their union and village. Enumerators used
all available information to locate respondents, including consulting with union officials and
asking local residents.
Survey finding rates
With this protocol, we were able to interview 3,512 lottery applicants, of which 1,127 in group
T1, 1,138 in group T2, and 1,247 lottery losers in our control group. We conducted interviews
with the applicants themselves if they were present, or with knowledgeable family members
if they were absent. However, the finding rate for respondents varied by treatment status.
We found 94 percent of the T1 applicants we searched for, 69 percent of T2 applicants, and
68 percent of the control group.
Given the scant information we had to locate lottery participants, the finding rate of
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the control group (68 percent) is quite high. For reference, Clemens and Tiongson (2017)
was able to locate and interview only 44 percent of applicants in their Philippines-Korea
migration study. The extensive field engagement of the enumerators and, perhaps, the rural
setting of Bangladesh, where villagers tend to know about each other, led to the high finding
rate in our study.
A few factors explain the almost universal finding rate of T1 households. First, phase 1
lottery winners were required to interact with local officials to prepare for government inter-
mediation, so local officials were likely to know of them or have updated contact information.
Second, winning the lottery made them well-known in the communities. Third, given the
status conferred by international migration in rural Bangladesh, other villagers are more
likely to know the whereabouts of migrant families.
This, unfortunately, creates a differential finding rate of 26 percentage points between
treatment and control, which can complicate inference. The differential rate mostly reflects
the details of program administration rather than any differences in some underlying eco-
nomic characteristics. We try to be careful and use insights from the literature on differential
attrition (eg. Lee, 2009; Behaghel et al., 2015) in Appendix B and section 8 to investigate
how the differential finding rates can affect interpretation. We limit the main empirical in-
ferences and statements we make to ones that are robust under a broad set of reasonable
assumptions.
Comparison of the sample with the population
While our sample strategy yields a representative sample of the lottery applicants, the ap-
plicants themselves are non-randomly selected from the population. Those households must
have a member who satisfies the eligibility criteria, and is interested and able to finance the
trip to Malaysia. This would exclude households facing borrowing constraints.
Appendix Table C.1 compares our study sample to a nationally representative sample
of households drawn from the 2016/17 Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES)
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(BBS, 2017). To understand what distinguishes lottery participants from others, we succes-
sively restrict the HIES sample to rural areas, rural areas in the three divisions where we
conducted surveys, and further to households with a male aged 20-45 who would have been
eligible for the lottery.
Not surprisingly, households that participated in the lottery are more likely to have
a migrant and receive remittance income. A quarter of our sample (both treatment and
control) have had a migrant in the past 5 years, compared to 15 percent in the rural areas of
divisions we surveyed, and 9 percent nationwide. Our study sample has higher expenditures
and incomes and significantly lower poverty rates than national averages, probably partly
due to the large difference in remittance income and partly due to the selection of who
can bear international migration expenses. Our study sample is slightly younger and more
educated than other comparable national samples, and more likely to be entrepreneurial.
While households interested in migration are different from the population at large, our study
sample is the most policy-relevant sub-population for estimating the returns to migration:
those who are eager to migrate, and can finance the trip.
Balance
Time-invariant characteristics appear well balanced across treatment groups. We do not have
a true baseline collected before the visa lottery, but we collected data on characteristics that
are unlikely to change over time, and some retrospective pre-lottery outcomes. As Appendix
Table C.2 shows, a joint test across the 13 outcomes we measure fails to reject the null that
the characteristics are balanced across the lottery outcomes.
The table also shows that lottery participants were 29 years old on average at the time
of application, with 6.8 years of schooling. 60% were married at the time of the lottery and
lived in household with four others. Applicants were working virtually all year in 2012 (just
before the lottery), and earned about 8,800 Taka ($110) per-month.
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4.2 Empirical strategy
The lottery program was randomized, so we use a very simple specification to report intent-
to-treat (ITT) estimates:
yi = β1T1i + β2T2i + γXi + εi (1)
where yi is the outcome for applicant i, T1i and T2i indicate whether the applicant won
the Phase 1 lottery or the Phase 2 and Phase 3 lottery, Xi controls for baseline characteristics,
including upazila fixed effects, and εi represents the error terms assumed to be clustered at
the union level. We weight each observation so that the number of observations within each
treatment group is the same within each union.
We test multiple hypotheses simultaneously, so we present several adjustments to ac-
count for multiple inference (à la Anderson, 2008). First, when reporting results for specific
outcomes within a group, we control the False Discovery Rate (FDR) and present corrected
q-values for the reduced form. Second, for each group of outcomes, we construct an inverse-
covariance weighted summary index of all outcomes within the family. The summary index
is less prone to incorrect inference due to multiple hypotheses testing than the individual
outcomes. Third, we control for Family Wise Error Rate (FWER) when we summarize a set
of outcomes across the groups.
We sometimes report local average treatment effect (LATE) estimates of the effects of
migration, where we instrument the decision to migrate with random assignment to T1,
which are the phase 1 lottery winners who received immediate intermediation. We estimate:
yi = δMi + ηXi + εi
Mi = αT1i + ξXi + νi
(2)
where Mi indicates whether the applicant migrated abroad at any point after the initial
lottery, and εi and νi are error terms uncorrelated with each other. We exclude data on T2
due to potential violation of the exclusion restriction. The T2 group was initially offered
a delayed government intermediation which did not materialize as planned. It is possible
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that this group may have taken some steps in expectation of migration in the future, and
this could have affected their outcomes directly. Furthermore, only a small share of the T2
group received actual intermediation, making it a weak instrument for migration. However,
including T2 as an additional instrument does not substantively change the results.
5 Results
5.1 Effects of the Lottery on Migration
By the time we conducted our survey in 2018, over five years after the lottery, 76 percent of
the Phase 1 lottery winners (group T1) had migrated abroad, while 19 percent of the lottery
losers did (Figure 3). Around 70 percent of the T1 group’s travel was intermediated through
the government channels, and the vast majority who migrated from this group traveled to
Malaysia, which suggests that the lottery outcome had a very direct effect on the lottery
winners who received quick intermediation. However, only a small fraction of Phase 2 and
Phase 3 winners (group T2) - who were promised intermediation later - ultimately benefited
from it. Only 10% of T2 migrants were G2G-intermediated, and the T2 migration rate was
exactly 10 percentage points higher than that of the control group.
Reassuringly, migration rates captured in our survey closely match the migration numbers
in BMET’s administrative records. Extrapolating migration rates in our survey sample to
the full population of lottery participants across Bangladesh, our estimates would imply that
about 10,700 would have migrated. The official count provided by BMET officials in March
2018 was 9,800.
The G2G program affect migration modalities in a couple of dimensions. Almost all
T1 migrants traveled to Malaysia, while two-thirds of control group migrants traveled to
Gulf countries. Malaysia was the destination of choice for a quarter of the control group
migrants, but clearly some of the lottery winners would have otherwise ended up in Saudi
Arabia, Oman or Qatar. Malaysia was also the most popular destination for the T2 (delayed
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Figure 3: Impact of winning the lottery on migration
Source: Authors’ estimates from the survey data collected for this study.
Note: The Figure shows the impact of winning the lottery on migration. The bar shows the migration rates
and the vertical lines denote 95 percent confidence interval.
intermediation) group. Second, winning the lottery allowed T1 migrants to travel abroad
earlier than migrants from the control group. The average T1 migrant left 15 months after
the lottery, while T2 and control group migrants traveled 33 months after the lottery. Gov-
ernment intermediation clearly sped up the process: Of those who used the G2G mechanism,
Phase 1 winners (T1) migrated 14 months after the lottery, and Phase 2 and 3 winners (T2)
26 months after the lottery.
A large share of applicants who migrated were still abroad at the time of survey. This is
true for 75 percent of T1 migrants, and 78 percent of T2 and control group migrants. Since
our survey was conducted almost four years after the initial migration of T1 applicants, they
were evidently able to either extend their initial labor contract or find another job abroad.
Figure 4 shows that the G2G program changes the selection of who gets to migrate, by
(non-experimentally) comparing of the characteristics of treatment and ‘regular’ (control
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Figure 4: Differences between the G2G and non-G2G migrants
Source: Author’s calculations from the data collected for the survey.
Note: The Figure shows the difference between G2G and non-G2G migrants in terms of their networks
abroad and means of financing migration. The impacts are estimated using yi = α+βG2Gi+εi where G2Gi
is instrumented by T1. The estimation is restricted to the sample of migrants from T1 and C. Outcomes
are standardized to the relative to the control group mean and standard deviation for the plot. The effect
on the non-standardized outcomes and the control group mean appear as labels separated by ‘/’. The error
bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the union level.
group) migrants. First, regular migrants often find opportunities through social connections
(Munshi, 2003), while the G2G migrants found employment without any family or friends at
the destination. 30% of control group migrants had a relative in the destination country, only
3% of the G2G migrants did. Second, the program drastically lowered the cost of migration
from 414,000 BDT ( USD 5,300) to a sixth of the amount. As a result, G2G lottery winners
were 16 percentage point less likely to have to borrow to finance the trip, they borrowed
much less when they did, and at lower interest rates. In summary, the program extended
migration opportunities to those less connected internationally, and less well off.
Even then, G2G intermediation was unaffordable for some applicants. 54% of lottery
winners who chose not to migrate cite the cost of intermediation as the key barrier. 22% cite
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a change in family, personal, or local employment circumstances, and 11% failed the medical
and fitness screening conducted by BMET in Bangladesh. Very few respondents (2.6%) had
communication difficulties, and none mentioned rejection from Malaysia. In contrast, 79% of
non-migrants in the control group cite cost as the barrier. In summary, the program appears
to have been implemented well - exactly as designed, which made it a lucrative opportunity
for many, but still unaffordable for some.
5.2 Effects of Migration on Income and Labor Supply
In Table 1, we first examine the effect of winning the lottery on household income as well as
the various components of income earned at the origin and at the migration destination. In
the intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates from Equation (1) presented in column 1, we compare
the phase-1 lottery winners (T1) to the control groups of lottery losers. The instrumental
variables (IV) estimates of the effects of migration in column 2 instruments the migration
decision with random assignment to column 1. We apply the inverse hyperbolic sine transfor-
mation to all outcomes, so that coefficient estimates can be read an percent changes relative
to the control group. To judge statistical precision, we report both p-values and - because
we are studying many outcomes - q-values that adjust for the false discovery rate, to address
concerns about multiple hypothesis testing.
Households of visa lottery winners enjoy 61% greater income than households that lost
the lottery. The IV estimate indicates that those who migrated and received G2G inter-
mediation more than doubled their household income relative to those who lost the lottery.
Decomposing the components of income, we see that this is entirely due to very large in-
creases in labor income earned away at migration destinations among lottery winners (four
times larger), and the remittance that lottery-winning households receive (436% larger) com-
pared to the control group. The migrant’s absence does reduce the labor income earned by
the household in their village in Bangladesh (-156%), but that loss is not nearly large enough
to overcome the tremendous advantage in remittance earnings.
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Total income home and away 0.612 1.085 12.537
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Labor income, away 4.053 7.192 5.194
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Remittance income 4.362 7.520 2.379
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Labor income at home -1.557 -2.685 5.191
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Farm income 0.159 0.275 8.371
[0.466] [0.154] [0.459]
Non-farm business income -0.887 -1.530 5.131
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Rental and other income -0.091 -0.157 5.233
[0.659] [0.198] [0.654]
Total income at home (incl remittances) 0.300 0.517 12.112
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Source: Authors’ calculations from the survey data collected for this study.
Note: This table shows the intent-to-treat and IV estimates on household income measures indicated by the
row headers estimated using Equations (1) and (2). An inverse hyperbolic sine transformation is applied
to all income measures. Income measures with missing values, mostly for incomes abroad, are replaced by
the tenth percentile of incomes for applicants in the same destination and with same age and education.
Estimates are restricted to the sample of early treatment (T1) and the control group (C). Column (1) shows
the ITT estimates with associated p-values in brackets; the subsequent column shows the q-values adjusted
for False Discovery Rate to account for multiple hypotheses testing. Column (2) shows the IV estimates
and associated p-values in brackets. Column (3) presents the mean of the outcome for the control group.
Both ITT and IV estimates control for applicant height, age, religion, parental education, and indicators for
survey Upazilas. Standard errors are clustered at the union levels.
The IV coefficients are useful for tracking magnitudes of the impact of government-
intermediated migration. Migration increases remittance income by more than BDT 82,000
per year, whereas wage income earned at home falls by about BDT 33,000.
Other sources of household income show small, statistically insignificant changes. The
migrant’s absence did not fully displace agricultural (or other sources of) earnings in the
village in Bangladesh, and the household came out ahead on net by winning the visa lottery.
The reported q-values indicate that these large income effects are robust to concerns about
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multiple-inference.
Effects on Labor Supply and Earnings of the Migrant
Since the household income increase is largely driven by increases in labor income earned
abroad, we delve into the details of the lottery applicant’s hours worked and earnings abroad
in panel A of Table 2. We ask about income in various ways in our surveys. Across all
measures, we see substantial gains for lottery winners.






A. Impact on the applicant labor and income
Monthly income in 2015 0.596 1.022 9.659
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Income last month, (reported) 0.437 0.758 9.205
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Average monthly income (computed) 0.657 1.133 11.879
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Total hours worked -0.063 -0.109 8.350
[0.214] [0.057] [0.208]
B. Impact on labor and income of non-applicant family members
Monthly income in 2015 -0.083 -0.142 7.414
[0.362] [1.000] [0.355]
Income last month (reported) 0.051 0.088 5.028
[0.756] [1.000] [0.753]
Average monthly income (computed) 0.118 0.202 6.969
[0.436] [1.000] [0.433]
Total hours worked 0.096 0.165 5.008
[0.359] [1.000] [0.356]
Source: Authors’ calculations from the survey data collected for this study.
Note: This table shows the intent-to-treat and IV estimates on labor and income measures indicated by
the row headers estimated using Equations (1) and (2). Panel A shows the outcomes for the applicant
whereas Panel B shows the outcomes for non-applicant adult family member. An inverse hyperbolic sine
transformation is applied to all measures of labor and income. Income measures with missing values, mostly
for incomes abroad, are replaced by the tenth percentile of incomes for applicants in the same destination
and with same age and education. The sample restrictions and the table structure is identical to that of
Table 1. Both ITT and IV estimates control for applicant height, age, religion, parental education, and
indicators for survey Upazilas. Standard errors are clustered at the union levels.
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We first use a retrospective measure of the lottery applicant’s monthly income in 2015,
about one year after lottery winners in group T1 migrated to Malaysia.5 The second measure
asks about income in the month immediately preceding the survey. This addresses concerns
about biases with retrospective data, but introduces a new concern because incomes in
rural areas tend to be seasonal, and asking about any specific month can be prone to large
measurement error. We therefore add a third measure that computes the lottery applicant’s
income by adding up their wage income, profits from farms and family business, where profits
are allocated across involved household members in proportion to the hours they put in the
farm or family business.6
Lottery winners enjoy a large premium over lottery losers regardless of the income mea-
sure used. Across the three measures, we see that lottery winners earn 40-65% more than
lottery losers in the ITT specification, while migrants earn a premium of 75-113% in the IV
specification.
The increase in income is mostly driven by increase in hourly wage rates. Migration does
not change the total labor supply of the lottery applicants. Lottery losers work 49 hours
per week, which is statistically comparable to lottery winners and to migrants. However,
unlike non-migrants, who often combine wage work with self-employment and farm work,
migrants work almost exclusively in wage-work, in accordance with the G2G labor contracts.
We compute hourly wage rates, and find that the hourly productivity of migrants increase
by 0.73 log points (107 percent).
The remittance amounts we document in the previous table is small relative to the size of
5Note that for migrants who are away, the income measures are reported by their household members.
Family members often underestimate migrants’ income abroad (Seshan and Zubrickas, 2017). That would
create an underestimate the income gains from migration. However, we also asked their monthly income
during their migration episode. The reports made by the applicants themselves (if they had returned at the
time of the survey) were statistically identical to the reports made by their family members (if applicants
were still abroad). This suggests that such misreporting might not be too large in this context.
6This last measure is not reported for about a quarter of the applicants that were still abroad at the
time of our survey, which is disproportionately the case for lottery winners. We impute the missing income
by assuming that those migrants earn income equivalent to the 10th percentile of earnings of other migrants
in the same destination and with similar age, gender, and education profile. Even with the most extreme
assumption – that those with missing income data earn zero – we still estimate large, positive coefficients
for lottery winners and for migrants.
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this income increase. The IV estimate suggests that migration through G2G intermediation
increases household income in Bangladesh by BDT 130,000 per year. This is only a fraction
of the estimated income gains of the migrant, which is BDT 269,000. This suggests that
migrants do not remit all of their income back home. They may be consuming or saving
while abroad, or paying back debts they incurred to finance the trip.
Spillover Effects on the Labor Supply of other Household Members
The migration of a household member could affect labor supply and incomes of other mem-
bers of the family through multiple channels. Remittances could produce an income effect,
leading other household members to cut back their labor supply and consume more leisure.
Imperfections in the labor market that leads to reliance on family labor in rural areas of
developing countries (eg. Binzel and Assaad, 2011; Mu and Van de Walle, 2011; Shrestha,
2017a) could force other household members to increase their labor supply in the migrant’s
absence. Migration could also change the reservation wage for other household members.
In panel B of Table 2, we see very little spillover effect of winning the lottery on the labor
supply and earnings of household members other than the lottery applicant. Not only are
the effects statistically indistinguishable from zero, the point estimates are also small.
5.3 Effects on Consumption and Investments
We implemented detailed modules on food and non-food expenditures in our survey, modeled
after the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics consumption modules that were also used in other
trials conducted in Bangladesh (e.g. Bryan et al. 2014). Table 3 investigates whether the
large increase in income for lottery winners translates into greater consumption, and exactly
what those households spend the money on.
Lottery winners have 11.6% greater consumption than lottery losers. There is no big
change in food consumption, and the increase in expenditures is concentrated in the non-food
category. This is likely because – as noted above – those who could afford intermediation were
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relatively well-off by rural Bangladesh standards, and food deprivation is not a big concern
in this particular sample. The non-food aggregate includes expenditures on clothing, fuel,
travel, utilities, and household essentials.
We can use the IV estimates to compute the income elasticity of consumption. Per-capita
consumption in the control group was BDT 58,000 per year, which increases by 22 percent due
to migration. Our estimates imply an income elasticity of consumption of 0.379 (p = 0.002).
That is, for each $1 increase in household income (due to migration), consumption per-capita
increases by 29 cents.
Land and dwellings are the most important components of wealth in rural Bangladesh
(and an important form of savings for the middle class), so we examine the effects of the
lottery on those outcomes. Lottery winning households become significantly more likely to
make big-ticket expenditures on land and housing.7 They are more likely buy real estate, less
likely to sell, and the value of the land they own increases by 30% relative to lottery-losing
households. Lottery winners are 5 percentage points more likely to own “pakka dwellings”,
which are homes constructed using durable building materials like brick and cement. The
value of the dwelling is about 14% higher. Winners are 6.5 percentage points more likely
to invest in a private latrine in their home. Such large expenses on durables could explain
the gap between the (much larger) increase in migration income and (smaller) increase in
income measured at home. Migrants could be saving up some of their income in Malaysia
until they accumulate enough for large expenses on land and housing in Bangladesh.
Investments in children
When migrants are asked why they travel, earning money to educate children is frequently
cited as a key motive. Migration could also change perceptions about the returns to education
when migrants are exposed to new opportunities in a foreign labor market. We find a very
large 25% increase in educational expenditures among lottery winning families. The increase
7We asked about less common but consequential expenses such as purchase and sale of land and residences
over a 36-month recall window, to capture infrequent transactions.
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A. Impact on consumption
Consumption per capita 0.116 0.200 10.826
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Food per capita 0.039 0.066 10.256
[0.088] [0.031] [0.083]
Non-food exp. per capita 0.136 0.235 9.681
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Health exp. per capita 0.378 0.653 7.118
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Large exp. per capita 0.580 1.001 2.024
[0.035] [0.014] [0.031]
Value of land 0.298 0.514 13.464
[0.026] [0.012] [0.023]
Pakka or semi-pakka dwelling 0.048 0.082 0.216
[0.007] [0.005] [0.006]
Value of dwelling(s) 0.144 0.248 11.652
[0.002] [0.003] [0.002]
Has private latrine 0.065 0.112 0.727
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
B. Impact on investments
Education exp. per-capita 0.249 0.431 4.153
[0.046] [0.062] [0.042]
Education exp. per boy 0.083 0.143 9.411
[0.290] [0.170] [0.273]
Educational exp. per girl 0.143 0.245 9.367
[0.032] [0.059] [0.027]
Child attends school -0.002 -0.003 0.901
[0.901] [0.347] [0.898]
Child works for wage-work -0.012 -0.021 0.015
[0.016] [0.059] [0.012]
Protein per-capita 0.089 0.153 9.076
[0.008] [0.059] [0.007]
Tobacco per-capita 0.109 0.188 -1.076
[0.178] [0.120] [0.170]
Source: Authors’ calculations from the survey data collected for this study.
Note: This table shows the intent-to-treat and IV estimates on household consumption and investments as
indicated by the row headers estimated using Equations (1) and (2). An inverse hyperbolic sine transforma-
tion is applied to all measures of consumption. The sample restrictions and table structure is identical to
that of Table 1. Both ITT and IV estimates control for applicant height, age, religion, parental education,
and indicators for survey Upazilas. Standard errors are clustered at the union levels.
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is on the intensive margin: there are no significant changes to children’s propensity to attend
school. Over 90% of all children in our sample attend school (which is compulsory for children
in Bangladesh), so this is not the margin that is most relevant in this context.
We break educational expenditures down by the gender of the child, and see that daugh-
ters benefit more than sons. Girls in lottery-winning households experience an increase of 14
percent in educational expenditures, whereas boys only see a more modest, and statistically
insignificant, improvement of 8 percent. This asymmetric response reduces the gender gap,
because educational expenditures were 14% lower for girls than for boys in the control group.
For children aged 10 to 14, migration reduces the probability that a child works for wages;
1.5 percent of children in control group households worked for wages, and this essentially
disappears for all children – boys and girls – in households that won the visa lottery.
Another important type of investment in this context is protein consumption, which aids
physical and cognitive development of young children. Households that lost the lottery spent
BDT 12,000 per capita annually on animal proteins (eggs, fish, and meat).8 Winning the
lottery raises per-capita expenditures on animal proteins by 9 percent. Households that
win the lottery therefore increase the quality and nutrition value of the food they consume,
although they do not consume more food in the aggregate.
A concern typically expressed about opportunities that suddenly raise remittance income
is that households may spend the money on undesirable, temptation goods. Alcohol con-
sumption in Bangladesh is extremely low due to legal and religious restrictions, so we focus
on expenditures on cigarettes and other tobacco products. We do not detect any significant
impact, partly because only 6 percent of all lottery applicants report any expense on tobacco.
5.4 Effects on Poverty and Indebtedness
We measure the effect on the migration lottery on households escaping poverty measured at
three different internationally-accepted poverty lines: USD 1.90 per day, USD 3.20 per day,
8Our consumption measure includes the value of home-produced goods, since some households raise
livestock and poultry.
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and USD 5.50 per day. This program is not effective at reducing extreme poverty (defined
at PPP$ 1.90 per day). Only 2.7 percent of control group households were poor by this
measure. The extreme poverty rate is almost three times as high in rural areas of Bangladeshi
divisions where we conducted our surveys, but the majority of those households did not
participate in this lottery. Migration costs – even with subsidized government intermediation
– is BDT 45,000 per applicant, which is equivalent to more than two years of consumption
for households living in extreme poverty. Since households in extreme poverty self-selected
out of this program, we do not see any effect on food insecurity either, because this is a rare
problem in the sample of lottery applicants.
Winning the Malaysia visa lottery lowers poverty rate at the higher thresholds. 27 percent
of control group households were living under the PPP$ 3.20 per-day poverty line, and
winning the lottery reduces this by 3 percentage points. 70 percent were living under the
PPP$ 5.50 per-day poverty line, and winning the lottery reduces this by 10 percentage
points. In the IV specification, G2G-intermediated migration reduces this poverty rate by
18 percentage points.
A major policy concern with international migration as a development strategy is that
most migrants are forced to borrow at high interest rates to finance the trip, given exorbitant
fees charged by middlemen. Wages are withheld to repay such loans at high implicit interest
rates. Subsidized G2G-intermediation should help along this margin, which we investigate.
Winning the lottery makes households 5.5 percentage points less likely to take on a loan.
When we ask about sources of loans, we see the sharpest drop in loans from high-interest
moneylenders (who charge 58 percent annual interest on average), from 17 percent in the
control group to 11 percent among lottery winners. Consequently, the average annual interest
rate paid on loans drops significantly for lottery winners (from 21% to 18%), and household
net debt position improves by 20%.
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Poverty rate ($1.90 per day) -0.007 -0.013 0.027
[0.279] [0.141] [0.271]
Poverty rate ($3.20 per day) -0.031 -0.054 0.267
[0.088] [0.076] [0.084]
Poverty rate ($5.50 per day) -0.103 -0.178 0.701
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Not enough food -0.002 -0.004 0.023
[0.720] [0.259] [0.715]
Any loan -0.055 -0.095 0.734
[0.007] [0.012] [0.006]
Loans from Moneylender -0.064 -0.111 0.174
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Average annual interest rate -3.638 -6.632 21.370
[0.083] [0.076] [0.076]
Source: Authors’ calculations from the survey data collected for this study.
Note: This table shows the intent-to-treat and IV estimates on household poverty rate, food insecurity, and
financial security measures as indicated by the row headers estimated using Equations (1) and (2). The
sample restrictions and table structure is identical to that of Table 1. Both ITT and IV estimates control
for applicant height, age, religion, parental education, and indicators for survey Upazilas. Standard errors
are clustered at the union levels.
5.5 Effects on Entrepreneurship and Economic Activities at Home
Migration of a family member to Malaysia could affect the household’s economic or en-
trepreneurial activities in Bangladesh through multiple mechanisms. The remittance income
could increase resources available for business or agricultural investments, the family member
abroad could generate new ideas through this exposure abroad, but the migrant’s departure
could also remove the most entrepreneurial family member from Bangladesh.
We find in Table 5 that winning the lottery does not change the household’s propensity
to engage in either agriculture or livestock-rearing. However, lottery winning households are
7 percentage points less likely to operate a non-farm business than the 44% of lottery-losing
households that do. Conditional on operating an enterprise, winning the visa lottery further
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Has crop income -0.012 -0.021 0.737
[0.499] [0.599] [0.492]
Has Livestock -0.005 -0.009 0.788
[0.763] [0.632] [0.759]
Has non-farm business -0.069 -0.119 0.436
[0.001] [0.004] [0.000]
Value of business 0.042 0.080 11.382
[0.774] [0.632] [0.764]
Has capital expenditure for business -0.055 -0.102 0.792
[0.069] [0.103] [0.059]
Hired workers for business -0.064 -0.119 0.197
[0.021] [0.055] [0.016]
Source:Authors’ calculations from the survey data collected for this study.
Note: This table shows the intent-to-treat and IV estimates on household entrepreneurial outcomes as
indicated by the row headers estimated using Equations (1) and (2). Inverse hyperbolic sine transformation
is applied to value of business. The sample restrictions and table structure is identical to that of Table 1.
Both ITT and IV estimates control for applicant height, age, religion, parental education, and indicators for
survey Upazilas. Standard errors are clustered at the union levels.
lowers the likelihood of hiring an external worker for the business or having capital expen-
ditures by about 6 percentage points. The effect on capital expenditures is not statistically
significant once we apply false-discovery-rate adjusted q-values to infer statistical precision
under multiple hypothesis testing.
The reduction in non-farm business activity is most likely caused by the departure of
the family member who would otherwise engage in entrepreneurship at home. If that is the
case, then we might expect can expect a boomerang effect on entrepreneurship once the
migrant returns with his overseas exposure and accumulated savings. Indeed, there is some
(non-experimental) support for this theory in the data. Households with lottery winners
who migrated and returned by the time of our survey were 11 percentage points more likely
to operate a non-farm family business than households without a migrant.
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5.6 Effects on Household Demography
Migration mechanically changes the composition of the household, but it does not otherwise
change the household size. For example, winning the lottery does not affect the probability
that other (non-applicant) household members migrate.
However, migration reduces the likelihood of new household formation. While the lottery
winner is away in Malaysia, his nuclear family is less likely to split away from the broader
households they belonged to at the time of the lottery. That is, migration delays the process
of new household formation as applicants (or their spouses) are more likely to continue to
co-habitate with parents or siblings instead of forming their own households.






HH size, incl migrants 0.098 0.170 5.692
[0.261] [0.094] [0.253]
HH split since 2013 -0.032 -0.055 0.132
[0.015] [0.019] [0.013]
Has non-applicant migrant 0.009 0.016 0.295
[0.637] [0.190] [0.631]
Married since 2013 -0.033 -0.057 0.189
[0.048] [0.040] [0.043]
Has new HH member since 2013 -0.074 -0.128 0.460
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Applicant is the HH head -0.222 -0.383 0.507
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Applicant’s wife is the HH head 0.139 0.240 0.094
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Applicant’s parent is the HH head 0.038 0.065 0.359
[0.064] [0.045] [0.059]
Source:Authors’ calculations from the survey data collected for this study.
Note: This table shows the intent-to-treat and IV estimates on household composition measures as indicated
by the row headers estimated using Equations (1) and (2). The sample restrictions and table structure is
identical to that of Table 1. Both ITT and IV estimates control for applicant height, age, religion, parental
education, and indicators for survey Upazilas. Standard errors are clustered at the union levels.
30
Similarly, migration reduces the likelihood of inviting new members into the existing
households. This is because migration delays marriage among applicants. Four years after
winning the lottery, successful applicants were 3.3 percentage points less likely to be married
than the control group (p-val 0.048, FDR-adjusted q-val 0.106). The delay in marriage (and
therefore, childbirth) means that lottery-winning households are 7 percentage points less
likely to have a new household member compared to losers.
These demographic changes affect the composition of household headship. The absence
of the young male migrant means that household headship is likely to be skewed towards his
parent or his spouse. The wife of the lottery applicant becomes 14 percentage points more
likely to be classified as the household head.
Effects on Women’s Involvement in Decision-making
Only young males were eligible to participate in the Malaysian G2G lottery. Table 7 in-
dicates that the male migrant’s departure causes women to become more involved with
decision-making and managing household operations in Bangladesh. Our survey asked
about female involvement in making decisions across various dimensions involving children
(schooling, childcare), household expenses (expenses in health care, food, clothing, necessi-
ties, and managing daily finances), and other large decisions related to household business
or entrepreneurial activities (selling household assets, decisions related to farming such as
crop/seed choice and fertilizers, decisions related to household debt, and large purchases
such as of a house, land, or large appliances).
Female involvement in decision-making improved across all dimensions. Though females
were partly involved in making these decisions for about 60 percent of the households in
the control group, decisions were made exclusively by female members in only 10 percent
of households. Winning the lottery increased the likelihood that females are involved in
any decision-making by 3.5 percentage points, that they exclusively make decisions about
all matters by 8 percentage points (an increase of 75%), that they exclusively decide about
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Female: all matters 0.035 0.061 0.597
[0.021] [0.005] [0.017]
Only female: all matters 0.078 0.134 0.106
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Only female: big decisions 0.062 0.106 0.050
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Only female: HH expense related 0.092 0.159 0.082
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Only female: child matters 0.072 0.125 0.293
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Source: Authors’ calculations from the survey data collected for this study.
Note: This table shows the intent-to-treat and IV estimates on outcomes measuring female involvement
in decisionmaking as indicated by the row headers estimated using Equations (1) and (2). Outcomes with
a prefix "female" indicate that a female member is involved in decisionmaking process; outcomes with
prefix "only female" indicate that only female members are involved. ’Child matters’ involve decisions
regarding child health and education; ’HH expense’ involve decisions regarding expenditures in healthcare,
food, clothing, necessities, and managing daily finances; ’big decisions’ involve decisions regarding household
business or entrepreneurial activities such as selling assets, household debt, and choice of crop/seeds and
fertilizers. The sample restrictions and table structure is identical to that of Table 1. Both ITT and IV
estimates control for applicant height, age, religion, parental education, and indicators for survey Upazilas.
Standard errors are clustered at the union levels.
financial expenses by 6 percentage points, and about children’s matters by 7 percentage
points. These are all large, drastic change in the locus of intra-household decision-making in
rural Bangladesh, and the gains are especially large in areas where women were traditionally
not involved. Even for infrequent, large decisions where remote participation of the lottery
applicant may be possible, we see that women start playing a much larger role.
In Table 8 we study the heterogeneity of this improvement in female decision-making
power across different types of families, to further probe the conditions under which women
are most likely to gain influence. We find that the effects are more muted when the migrant’s
father is present: when he is alive, when he resides in the household, and when he (and not
the migrant) is characterized as the household head. Further, there is absolutely no increase
in female influence within the household when the applicant is not married at the time of
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the lottery. This implies that the decision-making power sometimes shift to the wife when
the migrant departs, but never to his mother or sisters or other female family members.
Table 8: Heterogeneous impact of migration on female decisionmaking













Migrated 0.134 0.193 0.204 0.205 0.199
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Migrated x HET -0.155 -0.124 -0.175 -0.186
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
HET 0.006 -0.029 -0.036 -0.045
[0.691] [0.047] [0.008] [0.001]
Migrated + inter-
action
0.037 0.080 0.030 0.013
[0.143] [0.000] [0.111] [0.384]
Source: Authors’ calculations from the survey data collected for this study.
Note: This table shows the heterogeneous impact of migration on female decisionmaking by various measures
of household composition at the time of the lottery. The heterogeneity measure (HET) is indicated by the
column heading. Each column represents a single regression estimated on the sample of early treatment
(T1) and the control group (C) with the exclusive female involvement in decisionmaking as the dependent
variable. Column (1) shows the IV estimate of Equation (2) for reference. Columns (2) - (5) include
interaction of migration with the heterogeneity measure with the treatment status and its interaction with
the heterogeneity measure used as instruments. All estimates control for applicant height, age, religion,
parental education, and indicators for survey Upazilas. Standard errors are clustered at the union levels.
The p-values are shown in brackets. The last row shows the estimates and p-value for the total effect of
migration on the sub-sample of heterogeneity indicator (HET).
6 Effects of Lottery on Pre-departure Investments in Skill
We investigate whether the lottery winners took any initiative to better prepare themselves
for work abroad before they departed. We asked applicants whether they made any invest-
ments in language or other skills, or in maintaining their health after the lottery outcome
was announced, but before they traveled (if at all). The T2 group - who won the lottery for
a phase 2 or phase 3 delayed intermediation that was ultimately not fully provided - gives
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us a unique analytical opportunity to study the effects of such preparatory investments on
labor market returns, even if the actual migration does not ultimately take place.








Took skills training 0.715 0.160 0.053
[0.000] [0.000]
Invest to learn a foreign language 0.335 0.077 0.022
[0.000] [0.000]
Invest to learn Malay 0.377 0.082 0.009
[0.000] [0.000]
Ate more food 0.176 0.119 0.060
[0.000] [0.000]
Ate more protein 0.211 0.143 0.073
[0.000] [0.000]
Did more exercise 0.113 0.081 0.040
[0.000] [0.000]
Took gym membership 0.007 0.002 0.003
[0.074] [0.588]
Source: Authors’ calculations from the survey data collected for this study.
Note: This table shows the intent-to-treat estimates of various treatments on skills investment measures
estimated using Equation (1). Outcomes are represented by the row headers. The first two columns show
the impact of early treatment (T1) and deferred expected treatment (T2) with p-values in brackets. The third
column presents the mean of the control group. Each row represents a separate regression. The estimations
control for applicant height, age, religion, parental education, and indicators for survey Upazilas. Standard
errors are clustered at the union levels.
Table 9 shows that winning the lottery has a large impact on investments to learn a
foreign language, particularly Malay, and in participating in skills training. About 35 percent
of group T1 and 9 percent of group T2 invested in foreign language training compared to
only 2 percent of the control group. 76 percent of group T1 participated in some formal skills
training compared to 20 percent of group T2 and only 5 percent of the control group. These
effects are likely driven by the G2G program requirements (see Appendix A). Lottery winners
participated in a 10-day training required by the Malaysian government that covered topics
related to palm-oil, agriculture, gardening, at the closest BMET Technical Training Centers
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(TTCs). The skills training rate in groups T1 and T2 are comparable to the migration rates
in those groups (76 percent and 30 percent respectively). In contrast, only 2-5% of migrants
in the control group invested in these skills, even though 20 percent eventually migrated.
We also find evidence of other investments not strictly required by the G2G program.
Lottery winners make investments to improve their physical strength, prior to traveling
abroad to conduct physically strenuous work at Malaysian plantations. Their intake of food
and protein increase, they were more likely to exercise, and even take out gym memberships.
The ratio of these investments to the migration rates were similar for group T1 and the control
group, which is not surprising because Bangladeshi men do strenuous work at outdoor sites in
the Gulf as well, where G2G lottery losers would often travel. Interestingly, the ratio of those
undertaking such investments in T2 relative to the eventual migration rate in that group
was significantly higher. It appears that group T2 – who were promised G2G intermediation
but the governments failed to follow through – overestimated their migration probability.
That gives us an opportunity to investigate whether such investments generate returns in
the domestic labor market.
We study this in two ways. First, we regress earnings on the specific skills that lottery
applicants (may have) invested in to compute a metric for ‘returns to skill’, and estimate
these returns separately for migrants and non-migrants. Results are shown in Table 10. The
migration decision is instrumented by the lottery outcome. The language learning and taking
formal skills training were both program requirements, so these decisions can reasonably be
treated as exogenous. We see that the formal skills training does not generate higher earnings
for migrants, but investing in learning a foreign language does. The added earnings effects
of language training is positive and large, but highly imprecisely estimated. Importantly,
neither formal skills training nor language training generates any monetary returns to non-
migrants who remain in the Bangladeshi labor market. The coefficient estimates are both
statistically insignificant, and very small.
Second, we focus only on the sample of T2 lottery winners who were promised deferred
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Table 10: Impact of skill acquisition on labor and income for migrants and non-migrants
Depvar: (1) (2)




A. Returns to skills investments among migrants (T1 vs. C)
Migrated 1.136 1.106
[0.001] [0.000]




Mean of SKILL among migrants 0.677 0.347
B. Returns to skills investment among non-migrants (T2 vs. C)
SKILL -0.556 42.005
[0.592] [0.440]
Mean of SKILL 0.081 0.029
Source: Authors’ calculations from the survey data collected for this study.
Note: This table tests the impact of skill acquisition on labor and income for migrants and non-migrants.
The measure of skill acquisition (SKILL) is indicated by the column heading. The dependent variable is the
inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the average monthly income (as defined in Table 2). Panel A shows
the IV estimation on the sample of early treatment (T1) and the control group with the lottery status and
its interaction with the skills acquisition measure serving as instruments. Panel B shows the IV estimation
on the sample of non-migrants from deferred expected treatment (T2) group and the control group with the
lottery status serving as the instrument for skill acquisition. Each column in each panel shows a separate
regression which controls for applicant height, age, religion, parental education, and indicators for survey
Upazilas. Standard errors are clustered at the union levels. The p-values are shown in brackets. The SKILL
measure in column (1) indicates that the applicant took skills training; in column (2) it indicates that they
took a language training on Malay, English, or Arabic.
intermediation, but where the government failed to follow through. As we documented
earlier, these applicants appeared to be taken by surprise in that many of them invested
in program requirements (took skills and language training), but the migration opportunity
never materialized. In panel B we estimate the returns to skill, by comparing non-migrants
from T2 and from the control group. The identification strategy exploits the fact that non-
migrants in T2 had ‘mistakenly’ invested in skills, based on the (unrealized) promise of
deferred intermediation. The comparison again shows that the skills and language training
generate zero returns in the domestic labor market.9
9We find that investing in other skills that were not strictly program requirements also generate zero
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7 Effects of G2G Program on the Migration Experience
Given concerns about ‘failed migration’, abuse and fraud in private sector intermediation, we
also investigate how G2G intermediation affects aspects of the migration experience. Figure
5 compares (non-experimentally) the experiences of G2G migrants in our treatment group
to that of ‘regular’ migrants in the control group.
Government intermediation ensures better pre-departure preparedness. G2G migrants
are 17 percentage points more likely to have a contract in place prior to migration, 18
percentage points more likely to have the required employment permits from BMET, and
12 percentage points more likely to have taken out an insurance policy against injuries,
accidents, and death. Government intermediation appears to be more reliable: a third of
migrants in the control group have to wait over 2 weeks to start work, and that is virtually
eliminated under G2G. G2G migrants work fewer hours per week (55 rather than 60) without
any significant loss in income, more likely to be allowed rest days and collect overtime pay.
On the other hand, palm oil plantation work in Malaysia appears to be more dangerous
than the types of jobs that regular migrants sort into. They are significantly more likely to
be injured, 10 percentage points more likely to witness workplace injuries, and 7 percentage
points more like to have witnessed workplace deaths, compared to control group migrants.
Given these negative results on the risk of workplace injury, it is important to engage
with the question of whether migration produces a net positive return for the lottery winners
and their families. Beyond various risks incurred at the destination10, the migrant’s absence
and separation from their family are also relevant for computing the household’s overall
welfare. Aggregate welfare is always difficult to assess, but migrant’s decision-making after
the initial contract expires is informative. 85% of the G2G migrants stay on in Malaysia
additional returns in the domestic labor market, but don’t emphasize these results because the decision to
invest in such skills is endogenous.
10Quantification of risks is hard in these contexts. Shrestha (2019) finds that mortality rates for Nepali
migrants in the Gulf countries and Malaysia are lower than the mortality rate for the same demographics
within Nepal, yet the perceptions and actions of potential migrants are hugely influenced by what they
observe.
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Figure 5: Comparison of migration experience between G2G and non-G2G migrants
Source: Author’s calculations from the data collected for the survey.
Note: The Figure shows the difference between G2G and non-G2G migrants in their experiences prior
to departure and at destination. The impacts are estimated using yi = α + βG2Gi + εi where G2Gi is
instrumented by T1. The estimation is restricted to the sample of migrants from T1 and C. Outcomes are
standardized to the relative to the control group mean and standard deviation for the plot. The effect on the
non-standardized outcomes and the control group mean appear as labels separated by ‘/’. The error bars
represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the union level.
after the initial contract duration of 2 years, and this represents a 30 percentage point
increase relative to control group migrants. The revealed preference embodied in migrants
overwhelmingly choosing to extend their contracts strongly suggest that the large economic
returns we document outweigh the discomfort associated with separation, working conditions
or risk of injury.
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8 Summary of Effects and Robustness of Results
Summary and robustness to multiple inference
As we are testing multiple outcomes, it is important to be vigilant about incorrect inferences
due to multiple hypothesis testing. One way to address this, beyond the FDR-corrected
q-values we report, is to construct a single index for each ‘domain’ by combining multiple
outcomes, instead of testing each one individually. For each group of outcomes presented in
Tables 1 - 7, we create a summary index which is the inverse-covariance weighted average of
standardized outcomes within each family. By construction, the index value in the control
group is normalized to have zero mean and a standard deviation of 1. Figure 6 shows the
impact of winning the lottery on these indexes, which also serves as a summary of what we
have learned about the effects of Malaysian visa lottery for Bangladeshi workers. As there
are multiple indexes, we adjust the p-values to control for family-wise error rate (FWER) -
the probability of rejecting at least one true null hypothesis of no effects.11 FWER corrected
p-values appear in brackets with conventional confidence intervals drawn in the figure.12
Consistent with the results above, winning the lottery increases household incomes by
0.19 standard deviations (σ), applicant labor supply and income by over 0.39σ. Conse-
quently, household consumption improves by 0.22σ, child investments increases by 0.19σ,
and poverty and insecurity fall by 0.25σ. The departure of the lottery winners has other
economic and demographic consequences: entrepreneurship back home falls by 0.19σ and
female involvement in household decision improves by 0.19σ. The FWER adjusted p-values
are less than 0.001 for each of these outcomes which suggests that the inferences we draw in
this study are robust to multiple inference concerns.
Figure 6 also shows spillover effects on other (non-lottery-applicant) family members.
Labor and incomes of other adults and females are not affected by the lottery. Appendix
11We implement the Westfall and Young (1993) free step-down resampling procedure with 10,000 simu-
lations.
12Papers employing these techniques to address multiple inference concerns include Anderson (2008) and
Casey et al. (2012) among many others.
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Figure 6: Summary of effects of winning the lottery
Source: Author’s calculations from the data collected for the survey.
Note: The Figure shows the impact of winning the lottery on indexes of outcomes in various domains. Each
index in the top panel of the figure is the inverse covariance weighted index of outcomes presented in Tables 1
- 7. The unit of impact is in standard deviation units (σ). FWER corrected p-values are presented in brackets
below the point estimates. Each index in the bottom panel of the figure is the inverse covariance weighted
index of outcomes presented in panel B of Table 2 and the same outcomes for adult female members.
D shows detailed results, including for outcomes not explicitly discussed in the main text.
Adjusting the summary indexes to include this broader set of outcomes also does not affect
the inferences drawn in this paper.
Robustness to differential finding rates
While our survey finding rates are high across the board, the differential success in finding
T1 (lottery winner) households could lead to concerns about differential selection along
unobservable dimensions. We devote Appendix B to addressing these concerns in depth.
Here, we present a brief summary.
Common non-parametric bounds (e.g. Lee 2009) are often wide and uninformative, as
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they trim the data from the extremes of the outcome distribution. The results we report on
the effects of the lottery on migration, on household income, on remittances, on individual in-
comes, and on pre-migration investments all pass even this stringent bounding criteria. This
is due to the very large impact of winning the migration lottery, coupled with our relatively
large sample size. However, those bounds are still too wide for a few other outcomes.
We next use insights from Behaghel et al. (2015) (BCGL) to tighten the bounds. Their
intuition is that, with increased enumerator effort, finding rates would equalize across treat-
ment groups. To implement this intuition, BCGL first artificially reduce exerted effort in the
group with higher finding rate so that the finding rates approximately equalize between the
groups. They then proceed with an approach similar to Lee (2009) in this restricted sample
to construct non-parametric bounds.
We adapt those insights in our context by retaining data on the specifics of the survey
effort we made in the field. We first use the number of phone calls made to track respondents
as a proxy for effort. Second, we utilize the fact that survey finding rates are lower in larger
villages, and add population decile the village belongs to as another measure of effort. The
bounds for most of our outcomes are quite tight with the BCGL approach.
The ‘excess’ close-to-universal finding rate of T1 households was because of the way
that the lottery program was administered. The lottery winners had to register with local
leadership, who our surveyors could easily locate. So another pragmatic approach we take
to test robustness is to randomly trim the excess sample from T1, and re-estimate treatment
effects. We repeat this process one million times for each outcome, and count the number
of simulation where we fail to reject the null at 95% significance level. For most of our key
outcomes we reject the null in every single simulation. The only exceptions are: (a) the
female decision-making index, where we fail to reject in only 17 simulations, and (b) for the
variable “household has an outstanding loan” where we fail to reject 1.9 percent of the time.
Lastly, we estimate the treatment effects only on villages that have equal (or similar)
finding rates. This restricted sample is typically restricted to the smaller villages within
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our sample. We find mostly similar effects in these sub-samples. The positive effects on
consumption and poverty reduction get a little larger, and the negative effect on household
entrepreneurship gets smaller. These make sense as these villages are likely to be poorer at
baseline, with fewer entrepreneurship opportunities outside farming.
9 Conclusion
Migration is a large part of the global economy, and low-skilled South Asian migrants working
temporarily in richer Asian nations under time-delimited labor contracts is the most common
type of global migration flow. Stories of worker abuse (Pattisson, 2013), fraud (Karim, 2019),
and human rights violations (Stephenson, 2015) often dominate informal evaluations of such
low-skill work migration programs. Media coverage also skews towards sensational (Siddiqui,
2019), but possibly rare and unrepresentative incidents that capture the world’s attention
in the absence of large-sample data. We provide an experimental evaluation using large-
sample, representative data and a rigorous research design, and track a broad range of socio-
economic and demographic effects. We learn that an international migration opportunity
triples the migrant’s earnings, and the remittances he sends doubles the incomes of his family
in Bangladesh. These effects are much larger than the returns to rural-urban migration
within Bangladesh, and in other developing countries (Lagakos et al., 2020).
These numbers imply that providing visas to low-skilled Bangladeshi workers to fill po-
sitions that richer countries like Malaysia cannot otherwise easily fill with domestic labor
would rank among the most successful anti-poverty and development interventions for rural
Bangladesh. To our knowledge, this is the only experimental evaluation to track the effects
of migration along such a large and important international corridor. Furthermore, we use
a sampling frame and sample size that is an order of magnitude larger than any other ex-
perimental evaluation of migration opportunities, allowing us to report statistically precise
estimates that would remain unbiased under a broad array of reasonable assumptions on
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sample selection, variable selection, or attrition.
We study migration under an innovative government-to-government agreement, and our
results highlight the positive role governments can play to improve access to migration op-
portunities among the poor, while limiting the risk of abuse they normally face due to market
failures in private sector intermediation. Migration costs were reduced by a factor of seven
under the G2G program. This allowed poorer households in Bangladesh to apply, which
partly explains the large welfare gains we document. The lottery mechanism also opened
up opportunities to those without pre-existing social contacts abroad. Yet, even in this con-
text, cost was a barrier for the very poorest Bangladeshi households. Those living under the
US$1.90 a day poverty line were vastly under-represented in our applicant pool. Even the
sharply reduced G2G intermediation costs were a deterrent for households with stringent
borrowing constraints. Expanding government intermediation services with financing could
channel such lucrative opportunities towards the poorest of the poor.
Some of our findings deserve a longer-run follow-up. The gains in female decision-making
power we observe could simply be the short-run effect of the migrant being temporarily
absent from the household. It would be important to track whether there are any persistent
changes in the balance of intra-household decision-making authority after male migrants
return home. Such gains for women proved to be short-lived in the case of seasonal domestic
migration within Bangladesh (Mobarak and Reimão, 2020). However, those trips are very
short-term, with the migrant leaving for only a few weeks at a time. The longer period of
absence in the G2G program, and exposure to a new culture could produce more persistent
effects. Second, household entrepreneurial activities in Bangladesh fall when an enterprising
member wins the lottery and departs. It would be important to track the longer-run effects
on entrepreneurship when the migrant returns with international work experience and the
liquidity to start new businesses.
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Appendix A The G2G intermediation process
The following steps provide an outline of the G2G intermediation process.
1. Interested and eligible men apply for the G2G lottery program through their Union
Information and Service Centers (UISCs). The application costs between BDT 50 and
BDT 100.
2. Lottery winners are notified via text messages. Winners go to the BMET website to
print their confirmation cards with detailed instructions.
3. Winners are asked to undergo a 10-day training at the closest Technical Training
Centers (TTCs). Training is prepared following Malaysian government requirements.
4. Winners (mostly Phase-I) undergo a medical test in one of the nine medical colleges
across Bangladesh.
5. TTCs prepare files for each applicant, which include copies of passport, full-size pic-
tures, and biometrics, along with evidence of clearing the medical test and completing
training and other required documents.
6. Individuals’ files (scanned into DVDs) are sent to Malaysia. Malaysian firms decide
which workers they want in their firms.
7. Malaysian government sends ‘Visas With Referral’ to the selected workers through
BMET.1
8. BMET notifies the selected workers through SMS, asking them to come to the BMET
office in Dhaka for final processing.
9. Workers submit their passports and necessary documents to BMET for visa processing.
They also deposit recruitment fees at the Expatriates’ Welfare Bank.
10. BMET conducts further processing to obtain visas as well as other documents, permits,
and clearance.
11. Workers sign employment contracts. The contracts are typically for a two-year period
with the possibility of renewal. Lodging is typically provided by the employers, whereas
food may not always be provided. The contracts ensure a basic salary of MYR 900
and allow the possibility of overtime work.
12. BMET issues plane tickets for the workers.
13. BMET conducts pre-departure training the day before departure. Workers spend the
night at the training camp and leave for Kuala-Lumpur the next day.
14. Migrant workers arrive in Kuala-Lumpur and are received by the employers in the
presence of a representative from the Bangladesh High Mission in Kuala-Lumpur.
1
Appendix B Bounding exercise to address differential find-
ing rates in the survey
B.1 Survey finding rates
With the field protocol described in Section 4, we were able to find and interview a higher
share of T1 group compared to T2 and the control group. As Appendix Figure C.1 shows,
the overall interview rates were 94 percent for T1, 69 percent for T2, and 68 percent for the
control group. The large follow-up rate for T1 is seen in both the phone-based tracking as
well as field-based tracking. While 47 percent of the control group were found through phone
calls, conditional on having a phone, or getting phone numbers from fellow applicants, 55
percent of T1 were found and 89 percent of T2 were found. The reason for this discrepancy is
that the phone records we got from BMET, albeit incomplete, were more up-to-date, as they
kept interacting with the winners for further recruitment processes. Among respondents who
we tracked on-field (all those not found by phone), the finding rate for the control group was
about 40 percent whereas the finding rates for the treated groups were significantly higher at
89 percent and 64 percent for T1 and T2 respectively. Enumerators found it much easier to
track the treated individuals in the villages because their information was more up to date
with the local authorities. The winners had to interact with local authorities to submit the
necessary information for their recruitment processing. Additionally, the treated applicants
also became more well known in the local community as a result of winning the lottery.
B.2 Impact of differential finding rates
Common non-parametric bounding approaches, such as the Lee (2009) bounds are uninfor-
mative for many of our outcomes due to our particularly high finding rate in the treatment
group (94 percent) relative to the control group (68 percent). This means that the Lee
bounds approach drops the highest and lowest 27 percent of the outcome variables in the
treatment group to construct the bounds. This extreme assumption naturally leads to wide
and uninformative bounds. However, even under the extreme assumption of Lee bounds,
migration and monthly income measure have bounds that are significantly different from
zero (columns 2 and 3, Appendix Table C.3).
However, for other measures where the impact of the lottery is not very high, traditional
Lee bounds estimate wide confidence intervals. This is partly because most of the outcomes
are intermediated through migration. For instance, if migration leads to higher household
expenditure, the Lee (lower) bound estimates of the ITT removes 27 percent of the migrants
from the treated group with highest expenditures. That is, the share of migrants in the
treated group falls from 76 percent to 49 percent, drastically reducing the power to detect
reasonable impacts. Columns 2 and 3 of Appendix Table C.3 show this.
We next estimate the bounds assuming that we had not searched for any of the applicants
in the field and completely relied on phone-based tracking. This is motivated by the high
finding rate of 89 percent for group T1 compared to 40 percent for the control group (Ap-
pendix Figure C.1). However, even if we had just relied completely on phone-based tracking,
there would still be a differential finding rate, as we would have found 55 percent of T1 and
44 percent of the control group. The Lee procedure will now remove 15 percent of the T1
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sample to estimate the bounds, slightly better than in the full sample. Unfortunately, as
columns 4 and 5 of Appendix Table C.3 show, the bounds are still too wide for outcomes
other than income and migration measures.
Another approach we use to tighten the bounds derives from Behaghel et al. (2015)
(henceforth BCGL). This approach instruments the difficulty in finding respondents with
some measure of effort exerted to find the respondents. The assumption of this approach
is that, with enough effort, the finding rate would equate across treatment groups. This
approach first selects different levels of effort in each treatment group in order to approxi-
mately balance the sample sizes and then runs a non-parametric procedure similar to the Lee
procedure in the truncated data. BCGL apply this method in a setting where they use the
number of phone call attempts made to locate the respondent as a truncating instrument.
This approach often leads to much tighter bounds, as it incorporates additional information
in constructing the bounds.
We follow the BCGL approach to construct bounds in our context as well. Columns
2 and 3 of Appendix Table C.4 show the BCGL bounds in our sub-sample of phone-found
applicants. In this estimation, we treat as non-missing only the cases where respondents were
found by phone (field found applicants are coded as missing). This procedure first truncates
the treatment group that was found with more than two attempts (about 8 percent of
the treatment group). The bounds are much tighter with this approach. Most of the key
outcomes and indexes have bounds that are significantly different from zero.
However, the sample for whom we had phone numbers is a non-random subset of the
treatment group. Among those we found, those for whom we had a phone number are
more likely to be a migrant. In addition, the assumption that we only did phone-based
tracking throws away 55 percent of the data. To incorporate the sample that was found in
the field, we apply the BCGL intuition to construct another truncating instrument. Finding
applicants is more difficult in highly populated unions. In our data, finding an increase in
union population by 1 percent is associated with a fall in finding rate of 6 percentage points.
Hence, we construct a truncating instrument which is defined as the number of phone call
attempts for those for whom we had a phone numbers and the population decile of the union
for those for whom we searched in the field. We qualitatively rank the phone attempts higher
(low-effort) than population decile to reflect higher effort of finding someone in the field.
The BCGL bounds with this truncating instrument are presented in columns 4 and 5 of
Appendix Table C.4. With this approach, the treated group is truncated at the top decile
of population if they were not found through phone-based tracking. This results in tighter
bounds for most of our estimates with bounds significantly different from zero for our key
results. However, the BCGL bounds have some limitations in our context. Migration status,
and treatment effect, differ by whether the respondent had a phone number. The BCGL, for
example, constructs the bounds by comparing the control group with the treatment group
that lives in lesser populated unions. This may introduce some bias or, at the least, change
the interpretation of the impact.
Lastly, we resort to a pragmatic approach to characterize the likelihood of large bias due
to differential finding rates. We assume that the higher finding rate of the treatment group
is due to the artifact of winning the lottery and not some underlying characteristics that
could directly affect the outcomes. With this assumption, we conduct 1 million monte-carlo
simulations where we remove a random subset of the treatment group in order to match the
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finding rate and estimate the ITT on each of the samples. Column 6 of Appendix Table C.4
reports the proportion of the simulations in which we fail to reject the null of no effect. For
most of our key outcomes, we do not fail to reject the null of no impact in a single simulation.
We fail to reject null impacts on female decisionmaking index 17 times (0.0017%). Hence,
any biases due to differential finding rates are extremely unlikely for our key outcomes. Only
for one outcome (household with a loan), we fail to reject at a higher rate of 1.9%.
Finally, in Appendix Table C.5, we present the ITT and IV estimates on sub-samples
restricted to unions where differential finding rates are low. We restrict to samples where
the finding rates are same for both treatment and control group (in columns 2 and 4) as
well as to unions where the finding rates are within 25 percentage points of each other (in
columns 3 and 6). The differential finding rates in these subsamples are, by construction,
either the same (96 percent) or very similar (94 percent for treatment and 92 percent for
control). As discussed earlier, unions where the finding rates were high are likely to have
lower population. These smaller unions are likely to also have different characteristics (such
as not being the main town or economic center). However, the table shows the ITT and IV
estimates in these sub-samples are similar to the full sample. The differences are, in most
cases, numerically small and statistically insignificant. The only meaningful differences are
for the index of entrepreneurial activities where we see muted impact and for household
consumption where we see increased impact in the sub-samples. These results are driven
by lack of some entrepreneurial opportunities and lower levels of consumption among these
households.
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Appendix C Additional Figures and Tables
Appendix Figures
Figure C.1: Finding rates by treatment status and mode of search
Source: Authors’ estimates from the survey data collected for this study.












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Any migrant, last 5 years 0.249 0.087 0.101 0.149 0.074
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Any remittance income 0.250 0.029 0.033 0.050 0.020
last year [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Per-capita consumption 58,584 55,204 48,722 54,578 50,811
[0.007] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000]
Log(per-capita consumption) 11.519 11.430 11.328 11.453 11.398
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Poverty rate 0.027 0.095 0.117 0.066 0.077
(PPP$1.90 per day) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Poverty rate 0.267 0.430 0.503 0.394 0.434
(PPP$3.20 per day) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Per-capita income 54,944 57,120 47,411 50,851 49,639
[0.346] [0.000] [0.073] [0.015]
Log(per-capita income) 10.967 11.151 11.023 11.087 11.097
[0.012] [0.441] [0.108] [0.085]
Average age of HH members 26.05 29.10 29.56 28.71 25.09
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.005]
Average education 5.90 4.50 3.95 4.10 4.48
among adults [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Household size 4.93 4.07 4.12 4.23 4.63
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Operates Non-farm business 0.436 0.179 0.164 0.156 0.191
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Farming Household 0.858 0.558 0.689 0.599 0.604
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Took loan in past year 0.734 0.302 0.332 0.280 0.317
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Source:Authors’ calculations from the survey data collected for this study and HIES 2016.
Note: This table shows the comparison of the study sample with the Bangladeshi population along outcome
measures indicated by the row headers. The first column presents the mean for the control group in the study
sample. The remaining columns presents the statistics for various subsamples of the nationally representative
Household Income and Expenditure Survey of 2016/2017. Column 2 presents the national sample; column
3 restricts this sample to rural areas; column 4 further restricts the sample to rural household in the survey
provinces of Dhaka, Mymensingh, and Chittagong; column 5 further restricts the sample to households with
a male member between the ages of 20 and 45. For each subsample and outcome, the p-value from the test
of equality of outcomes with the study sample is presented in brackets.
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Table C.2: Balance of characteristics across treatment groups










Age 34.01 -0.220 -0.383 0.164
[0.460] [0.212] [0.608]
Height, inches 64.98 0.220 0.157 0.064
[0.003] [0.034] [0.436]
Muslim 0.928 0.015 -0.025 0.040
[0.124] [0.024] [0.000]
Can read and write 0.808 0.003 -0.007 0.010
[0.854] [0.666] [0.511]
Completed years of education 6.83 -0.175 -0.020 -0.155
[0.307] [0.910] [0.313]
Father is alive 0.588 -0.009 -0.004 -0.005
[0.680] [0.858] [0.815]
Father’s years of education 3.16 -0.255 0.157 -0.411
[0.115] [0.354] [0.020]
Mother is alive 0.835 -0.009 0.004 -0.013
[0.573] [0.818] [0.412]
Mother’s years of education 1.67 -0.075 0.176 -0.251
[0.505] [0.167] [0.051]
Married before lottery 0.615 -0.016 -0.024 0.008
[0.383] [0.247] [0.710]
HH size before lottery 4.98 -0.185 -0.170 -0.015
[0.107] [0.147] [0.889]
Months worked in 2012 11.37 -0.051 0.049 -0.100
[0.497] [0.487] [0.145]
Average monthly income in 2012 8810 565.4 86.7 478.7
[0.236] [0.871] [0.385]
Joint p-value across all outcomes [0.225] [0.339] [0.319]
Source:Authors’ calculations from the survey data collected for this study.
Note: The table shows the relationship between individual characteristics and the treatment status. The
first column shows the mean of the characteristic in the control group. The rest of the columns show the
differences between various treatment groups as indicated in the column headers with p-values in brackets.
Each row is estimated from a regression of the characteristic on the treatment indicators controlling for
upazila fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the union level. The last row shows the p-value of a
joint-test that all coefficients in each column are jointly zero.
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Table C.3: Lee bounds on ITT estimates accounting for differential finding rates















Migrated abroad 0.571 0.483 0.806 0.611 0.783
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
ihs(Total income, home and away) 0.570 0.225 0.998 0.468 0.965
[0.000] [0.022] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
ihs(Remittance income) 4.555 2.303 7.725 3.290 6.368
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
ihs(monthly income, computed) 0.721 0.288 1.381 0.466 1.302
[0.000] [0.004] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000]
Index: Labor and Income 0.406 0.158 0.808 0.252 0.711
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Log(Consumption per capita) 0.120 -0.149 0.359 -0.065 0.236
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.121] [0.000]
Index: HH consumption 0.199 -0.247 0.657 -0.022 0.505
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.760] [0.000]
Index: Investment in children 0.192 -0.153 0.594 -0.065 0.411
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.338] [0.000]
Any loan -0.052 -0.171 0.208 -0.110 0.062
[0.007] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.145]
Index: Poverty and insecurity -0.241 -0.685 0.132 -0.536 -0.056
[0.000] [0.000] [0.005] [0.000] [0.448]
Index: Entrepreneurial -0.198 -1.071 0.192 -0.527 0.004
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.957]
Index: Female decisionmaking 0.184 -0.414 0.639 -0.260 0.349
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Index: Pre-migration investments 2.599 1.401 4.145 1.943 3.054
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Source:Authors’ calculations from the survey data collected for this study.
Note: This table shows non-parametric Lee bounds to address the differential finding rates on select outcomes
indicated in the row headers. Column 1 shows the ITT estimate (unweighted) for reference estimated using
Equation (1) on the sample including T1 and control group. Columns 2 and 3 shows the Lee (2009) bounds
on the full sample. Columns 4 and 5 show the Lee bounds assuming that we had conducted surveys only
among applicants who were found by phone. p-values of the estimates in brackets.
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Table C.4: Behaghel et al. bounds on ITT estimates and simulations results


















Migrated abroad 0.571 0.633 0.664 0.571 0.586 0.000000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
ihs(Total income, home 0.570 0.622 0.723 0.555 0.596 0.000000
and away) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
ihs(Remittance income) 4.555 4.135 4.955 4.512 4.670 0.000000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
ihs(monthly income, computed) 0.721 0.668 0.825 0.708 0.754 0.000000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Index: Labor and Income 0.406 0.337 0.433 0.387 0.418 0.000000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Log(Consumption per capita) 0.120 0.079 0.158 0.100 0.121 0.000000
[0.000] [0.069] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Index: HH consumption 0.199 0.106 0.272 0.179 0.228 0.000000
[0.000] [0.180] [0.000] [0.003] [0.000]
Index: Investment in children 0.192 0.094 0.215 0.165 0.200 0.000000
[0.000] [0.195] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Any loan -0.052 -0.076 0.010 -0.056 -0.041 0.018765
[0.007] [0.056] [0.736] [0.012] [0.228]
Index: Poverty and insecurity -0.241 -0.307 -0.152 -0.246 -0.197 0.000000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.046] [0.000] [0.001]
Index: Entrepreneurial -0.198 -0.265 -0.113 -0.205 -0.168 0.000000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.250] [0.000] [0.001]
Index: Female decisionmaking 0.184 0.028 0.226 0.163 0.210 0.000017
[0.000] [0.730] [0.028] [0.011] [0.001]
Index: Pre-migration investments 2.599 2.405 2.792 2.562 2.676 0.000000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Source:Authors’ calculations from the survey data collected for this study.
Note: This table shows non-parametric bounds to address the differential finding rate on select outcomes indicated in the row
headers. Column 1 shows the ITT estimate (unweighted) for reference estimated using Equation (1) on the sample including
T1 and control group. Columns 2 and 3 shows the Behaghel et al. (2015) (BCGL) bounds on the sample using phone call
attempts as the truncating instrument. These bounds are estimated in that sample that were found through phone calls.
Columns 4 and 5 shows the BCGL bounds on the full sample using a mix of phone call attempts and a measure of union
population as the truncating instrument. The p-values for the estimates and bounds are presented in brackets. Column 6
shows the proportion of monte-carlo simulations in which we fail to reject the null of no effects of winning the lottery at 95
percent significance level. Each of the 1 million simulation chooses a random subset of the treatment group to match the
finding rates between the treated and the control groups.
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Table C.5: ITT and IV estimates on trimmed samples to match finding rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





Sample size 2239 963 1087
Finding rate (treatment) 0.939 0.960 0.943
Finding rate (control) 0.681 0.960 0.923
Migrated abroad 0.580 0.556 0.548
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
ihs(Total income home and away) 0.612 0.721 0.667 1.085 1.338 1.249
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
ihs(Remittance income) 4.362 3.827 3.646 7.520 6.886 6.649
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
ihs(monthly income, computed) 0.657 0.610 0.577 1.133 1.095 1.051
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Index: Labor and Income 0.390 0.412 0.396 0.672 0.740 0.721
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Log(Consumption per capita) 0.116 0.143 0.136 0.200 0.258 0.248
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Index: HH consumption 0.216 0.259 0.247 0.372 0.467 0.450
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Index: Investment in children 0.191 0.192 0.163 0.329 0.346 0.296
[0.000] [0.001] [0.003] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002]
Any loan -0.055 -0.054 -0.056 -0.095 -0.097 -0.102
[0.007] [0.067] [0.054] [0.006] [0.059] [0.047]
Index: Poverty and insecurity -0.256 -0.293 -0.269 -0.442 -0.527 -0.491
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Index: Entrepreneurial -0.190 -0.079 -0.092 -0.328 -0.143 -0.167
[0.000] [0.180] [0.109] [0.000] [0.162] [0.094]
Index: Female decisionmaking 0.192 0.153 0.157 0.331 0.275 0.287
[0.000] [0.030] [0.020] [0.000] [0.021] [0.013]
Index: Pre-migration investments 2.609 2.536 2.516 4.498 4.563 4.588
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Source:Authors’ calculations from the survey data collected for this study.
Note: This table shows the ITT (columns 1-3) and IV (columns 4-6) estimates on various subsamples of the data.
Columns 1 and 4 present the estimates in the full sample of T1 and control group. Columns 2 and 5 restrict the
estimation to unions where the finding rates are identical. Columns 3 and 6 restrict the estimations to unions where
the differential finding rate is below 25 percentage points. The first three rows shows the sample size and finding rates
across these sub-samples. p-values for the estimates are shown in brackets.
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